Search results for "Credit rationing"
showing 6 items of 6 documents
The role of «perceived loss» aversion on credit screening: an experiment
2013
A major characteristic of credit markets is information asymmetry.To combat its problems, as credit rationing, principals can use a menu of contracts to screen clients with different risk level. We conduct a laboratory experiment to address an important question for such settings —does the framing of the offered menu of contracts interfere with the self-selection mechanism? The answer is yes. We find subjects' choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes of the same menu of contracts are presented in two different frames. Subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception of the positive outcomes below the reference point, and self-selection fails to occur. Uno de los mayores problemas a…
Financing successful small business projects
2014
Purpose – The current credit rationing strongly influences the viability of SMEs innovation projects. In this context, the practice of screening borrowers by project success probability has become a paramount consideration for both lenders and firms. The aim of this paper is to test the screening role of loan contracts that consider collateral-interest margins simultaneously. Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents an empirical analysis that uses a unique data set composed of 323 bank loans granted by 28 banks to SMEs backed by a Spanish Mutual Guarantee Institution. Findings – The results show that appropriate combinations of collateral and interest rates can distinguish between…
Optimal lending contracts
2016
This paper deals with financial contracting between a lender and a borrower with a project to finance. The borrower is protected by limited liability. We consider that the revenue from the project is observable and verifiable but its distribution is influenced by both the borrower’s choice of action and the project’s quality, which are private information. We find that debt contracts are endogenously optimal, as under moral hazard alone. Moreover, while moral hazard leads to credit rationing for the lowest-quality projects only, adding adverse selection creates a bang-bang result: either all projects or none are credit rationed.
The Impact of Financial Arrangements and Institutional Form on Housing Prices
2009
Published version of an article from the journal: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. Also available on SpringerLink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11146-009-9213-z Dwellings in housing cooperatives constitute 15% of the Norwegian housing property market. The price paid for such dwellings consists of two elements: An equity price and a share of the mutual debt held by the cooperative. The interest rate paid on the housing cooperative’s mutual debt is in Norway lower than the interest rate paid on private loans. This gives rise to an interest discount effect . We find convincing empirical support for the interest discount effect, which contributes to a higher equity price for dwel…
Entrepreneurship and Credit Rationing: How to Screen Successful Projects in this Current Crisis Period
2013
The current credit rationing heavily influences entrepreneurship and, more dramatically, the viability of innovation projects. In this context, mechanisms to screen successful projects are of paramount importance for both lenders and entrepreneurs. We present an experiment to test the collateral-interest mechanism of credit screening. Our results confirm that incentive-compatible pairs of collateral-interest rate can distinguish between projects of different success probability, even in moral hazard settings.
PASSAGE OBLIGATOIRE AUX NORMES COMPTABLES IAS/IFRS, CONTRAINTES EN LIQUIDITE ET RATIONNEMENT DU CREDIT : UNE ETUDE EMPIRIQUE DANS L'INDUSTRIE BANCAIR…
2012
Financial theory indicates that banks dependent on external resources and/or financially fragile have more difficulties in refinancing their operations of credit supply, due to the informational problems they face and/or they cause. In this context, this study tests the hypothesis that the mandatory adoption by banks of the IAS/IFRS accounting standards, known to be of higher quality, leads to an increase in the quantity of loans granted by banks constrained in liquidity, all else equal. Based on a sample of European banks, between 2003 and 2008, we obtain results in favour of this hypothesis.